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Abstract 
In the recent debate concerning the boundary of mind, the 
extended mind thesis (EMT), which states that our mind and 
cognition are extended into the environment, is influential as an 
antithesis to the internalist (or Cartesian) view, according to 
which mind and cognition are in the head. However, EMT has 
some serious difficulties. On the contrary to its proponents’ 
claim, EMT contributes neither to demystifying the mind, nor 
to promoting our understanding of cognition. Moreover, it leads 
to an extreme kind of individualism by regarding environmental 
resources as constituents of individual human minds. After 
showing this, I explore an alternative anti-Cartesian picture of 
mind through citing Dewey’s view of the locus of mind. 
Although the proponents of EMT often invoke Dewey as a 
pioneer of their view, his view is in fact the one that should be 
called the ‘unbounded mind’ rather than the ‘extended mind’. 
Furthermore, I show that Dewey’s view indicates a root to 
overcome the individualistic dogma that is shared by 
internalists and the EMT theorists. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
n this paper, I address the question ‘where does the mind 
stop, and the rest of the world begin?’ [Clark 1997: 213; 
Noë 2004: 221; see also Wilson 2004: 3]. The standard 
answer to this ‘boundary of mind’ question has been the 
internalist (sometimes called ‘Cartesian’) view, according to 
which mind is (or at least realized solely by) brain and hence 
it is in the head. In a recent debate, though, many theorists 
propose the extended mind thesis (EMT) that mind is 
extended into the environment, and it has become influential 
as an antithesis to internalism. EMT is submitted as part of a 
solution to the mind-body problem. For example, Clark 
[2003] proposes to reconstruct the mind-body problem as the 
‘mind-body-scaffolding problem’, or ‘the problem of 
understanding how human thought and reason is born out of 
looping interactions between material brains, material 
bodies, and complex cultural and technological 
environments’ [ibid.: 11]. The proponents of EMT such as 
Clark aim to ‘naturalize’ mind by locating it in the physical 
world, just as most contemporary internalists do.i 
Nevertheless, the former does not try to locate it in the head, 
but in a wider region of the physical world: the region made 
up of body and environment in addition to brain. At the same 
time, EMT is intended to provide better explanatory methods 
for cognitive science, and so promote our understanding of 
cognition.  
 
However, as I see it, EMT doesn’t contribute to achieving its 
proponents’ goals. Above all, as I will show below, it is hard 
to understand why relocating the boundary of mind 
somewhere outside of skull and skin serves to solve the 
mind-body problem. Moreover, it is unclear how seeing the 
mind as extended contributes to our understanding of 
cognition. In addition, EMT paradoxically leads to an 
extreme kind of individualism by regarding external 
I 
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resources as constituents of individual human minds.  
 
On this background, I will explore the possibility of an 
alternative anti-Cartesian picture of mind through citing 
Dewey’s philosophy of mind. Although the proponents of 
EMT often invoke Dewey as a pioneer of their view, 
Dewey’s view is substantially different from EMT. I will 
argue that Dewey’s view is the one that should be called the 
‘unbounded mind’ rather than the ‘extended mind’. Though 
his proposal cannot be easily introduced in the metaphysical 
framework that contemporary theorists adopt, I believe that 
we can get some morals from it. I will suggest that the 
boundary of mind debate neglects an antithesis to 
Cartesianism that is more radical than EMT. Moreover, 
Dewey’s view indicates a root to overcome the 
individualistic dogma that is shared by both internalists and 
the EMT theorists. 
 
1.  A CASE AGAINST THE EXTENDED MIND 
 
The proponents of EMT hold that some of our mental states 
or processes are partly constituted by environmental entities 
or events. For example, they claim that, when I calculate by 
writing on a paper, my thinking process occurs partly on the 
paper [cf. Wilson 1994]; if I always carry a notebook or 
accompany a partner, my belief state lies partly on the 
notebook or in the partner’s location [cf. Clark & Chalmers 
1998]; or, when I move and look around, my visual 
experience occurs partly in the surrounding environment [cf. 
Noë 2004].ii 
 
I find that the boundary of mind debate is deeply confused, 
and that one major source of this confusion is the loose and 
inflationary use of the term ‘extended mind’.iii Therefore, I 
set two conditions on EMT. First, any version of EMT must 
be ‘vehicle externalism’ [Hurley 1998], according to which 
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physical vehicles of some mental events or states are partly 
located in the environment. Second, any version of EMT 
must be a thesis about individual human minds. According 
to EMT, mental states or processes of individual human 
agents are extended. It should be distinguished from the 
thesis that groups of individual agents or groups of 
individual agent(s) and instrument(s) have some cognitive 
states or processes that are not confined to any individual 
organism. (I will formulate the latter thesis as ‘the socially 
distributed cognition theory’ below.) These conditions might 
exclude some theorists who call themselves the ‘proponents 
of EMT’ from the EMT camp. Nevertheless, there also are a 
certain number of theorists [e.g. Clark & Chalmers 1998; 
Noë 2004; Menary 2007] who defend the position that is 
properly qualified as EMT in the above senseiv. Especially, 
Clark [2003] enthusiastically claims that we, individual 
human agents, are ‘natural-born cyborgs’, whose minds are 
partly constituted by technological resources that are 
externally located.  
 
As I see it, EMT as thus formulated is unpromising. This is 
partly because it doesn’t contribute to achieving its 
proponents’ goal. One of the EMT theorists’ aims is to 
demystify the mind. They argue that regarding the brain as 
the sole seat of mind leads to the erroneous view that skin 
and skull are mysterious boundaries (‘magical membrane’ 
[Hurley 1998]) and the brain is a mysterious matter (‘magic 
dust’ [Clark 2008]). For example, Noë accuses 
contemporary neuroscientists who adopt internalism of 
committing such an error. He says: 
 
They treat the mind as standing to the body 
as a pilot does to his ship and they deceive 
themselves into thinking they’ve eliminated 
mystery because they use the word “mind” to 
refer to the brain. The brain, thought of in this 
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way, is less material mind than spiritualized 
matter; instead of eliminating the mystery 
from the mental, they’ve simply concocted a 
mysterious account of the physical. [Noë 
2004: 215] 
 
But why should we think that the boundary 
formed by the limits of brain is special when 
compared with other boundaries that can be 
drawn inside the brain …? … [T]he skull is 
not a magical membrane; why not take 
seriously the possibility that the causal 
processes that matter for consciousness are 
themselves boundary crossing and, therefore, 
world involving? [Noë 2009, p.49, original 
emphasis] 
 
However, this seems to be a straw man argument: with only 
few exceptions (such as Searle [1980]), most of 
contemporary internalists don’t claim that neural stuff has 
some mysterious intrinsic property that makes the brain the 
sole seat of mind. Instead, they hold that the information 
flow inside skin and skull satisfies a certain functional 
condition about informational access that the information 
flow beyond them doesn’t, and that such a condition matters 
for determining the boundary of mindv. Moreover, it is hard 
to understand why identifying the brain as the locus of mind 
would lead to regarding skin and skull as ‘magical 
membrane’. To see this, let’s compare thinking with blood 
pumping: identifying the heart as the locus of pumping in 
blood circulation doesn’t lead to regarding the pericardium 
as a magical membrane. If so, why can’t we think about the 
locus of thinking in the same way?  
 
Another aim of the EMT theorists is to call our attention to 
the need to focus on interaction among brain, body, and 
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environment in order to understand cognition. They insist 
that internalists underestimate bodily and environmental 
contributions to cognitive activity. For, on this conception, 
all body and environment do is to provide inputs to and to 
receive outputs from mind. Along this line of thought, 
Menary says: 
 
‘If cognition is bounded by the brain, why do 
we not complete all these cognitive tasks 
[solving mathematical problems and rotating 
the shapes on the screen in Tetris], and many 
others like them, “in the head?”’ [Menary 
2007: 3].  
 
However, this argument is unconvincing. In the present 
passage, Menary presupposes that any factor that plays some 
significant role in accomplishing some cognitive task must 
be a constituent of cognition. This is not the case. 
Explanations of intelligent behaviours invoke not only 
factors that constitutively contribute to cognition, but also 
factors that merely causally contribute to it. And the latter 
factors can be explanatorily as significant as the former [cf. 
Rupert 2004; Sprevak 2010]. While denying that the 
environment constitutes cognitive processes, internalists can 
concede that the environment facilitates our cognitive 
processes by continuously providing inputs through bodily 
interaction during processing. Hence we can admit, without 
accepting EMT, that understanding cognition requires us to 
take interaction among brain, body, and environment into 
account. Then, in what respect is EMT explanatorily 
superior to internalism? To my knowledge, EMT theorists 
offer no convincing answer to this question.vi 
 
Furthermore, by regarding external resources as parts of 
individual human minds, EMT leads to an extreme (and 
harmful) kind of individualismvii. This is clearly shown in 
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cases of group problem solving. The EMT theorists [e.g. 
Clark & Chalmers 1998] claim that such cases can be 
explained on the basis of EMT, too. According to their 
‘socially extended cognition’ thesis, each of our minds can 
be extended not only to tools, but also to other agents. 
Suppose that I solve complex mathematical problems 
through relying on another agent A. EMT says that A is a 
constituent of my thinking process. However, if that were the 
case, the problem-solving behaviour could be explained by 
appealing only to my cognitive processes, as if I solved the 
problem alone. This way of explanation misses the fact that 
I solve the problem together with A.  
 
The EMT theorists might reply that the EMT-based way of 
explanation doesn’t miss the fact that I solve the problem 
together with A, insisting that cognitive processes could be 
shared, and that a symbol manipulation could be my 
cognitive process and A’s one at the same time. However, 
this reply is unhelpful. For, in order to explain why I 
cooperate with A, we must admit that some of the cognitive 
processes that are carried out to solve the problem are 
unshared by me. Suppose, for example, that I ask A to write 
down a certain mathematical formula on a blackboard. The 
best way to explain why I do so is to admit that citing this 
formula is required to solve the problem, but I lack the 
knowledge of it. In this way of explanation, the knowledge 
of the formula is supposed to be no part of my cognitive 
capacity, and the process of exercising it to write down the 
formula is supposed to be no part of my cognitive process. 
This is what EMT denies. Thus, my objection holds. EMT 
cannot explain cases of group problem-solving 
appropriately.  
 
The same point can be applied to cases of tool use, too. To 
see this, let’s consider: why do we usually solve complex 
arithmetic problems through calculation by writing using a 
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pen and a piece of paper? The standard answer in psychology 
of tool use says that it is because, by using these tools to 
create external symbols, we can offload cognitive work onto 
the environment (cf. Hutchins, 1990; Norman, 1993; 
Dennett, 1996). First, since the set of symbols functions as 
an information-storing resource, we don’t need to remember 
intermediate results: our memory load is reduced. Second, 
since the set of symbols functions as an attention-guiding 
resource, we don’t need to think, but can immediately see 
what to do next: our computational load is reduced. This 
shows that we can divide cognitive labor [Hutchins 1995] 
with tools (as well as with other agents). On the one hand, 
subtasks such as motor control and perceptual processing 
are borne by us. On the other hand, subtasks such as storing 
intermediate results and guiding one’s attention are borne by 
symbols on the paper. So, among the whole problem-solving 
task, only a part of subtasks can be thought of as 
accomplished through one’s cognitive processes. Keeping 
this point in mind, let’s consider the case where I solve an 
arithmetic problem through calculation by writing using a 
pen and a paper. Even in this case, there turns out to be a 
division of cognitive labor among me, the pen, and the paper. 
I don’t solve the problem alone, but together with the pen 
and the paper. Therefore, we should not regard the whole 
calculation process carried out by me, the pen, and the paper 
as my cognitive process.  
 
In short, EMT mistakes what each of us achieves together 
with others or tools for something achieved by each of us 
alone. I want to stress that, by making this error, EMT makes 
it incomprehensible why we cooperate with each other and 
why we use tools. We rely on others or tools, because our 
cognitive capacities (such as those for memory or attention) 
are limited. EMT makes this fact invisible to us, since it 
overestimates human individuals’ cognitive capacities by 
admitting that these capacities are partly supported by 
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environmental resources.  
 
For these reasons, I judge that EMT is unpromising. It’s true 
that EMT looks radical, but being radical is not a theoretical 
advantage. Its proponents fail to show that EMT is a better 
theory than internalism. Moreover, we can question whether 
EMT is truly radical enough. Doesn’t it leave any deeper 
point unexamined? In the following, I will consider this 
question through comparing EMT with Dewey’s view of the 
locus of mind. 
 
2. DEWEY ON THE LOCUS OF MIND 
 
2.1 IS DEWEY A POINEER OF EMT? 
 
The proponents of EMT often mention Dewey as an early 
advocate of EMT. It’s true that Dewey repeatedly criticizes 
the Cartesian view that mind is in the head. In this regard, he 
is in line with the spirit of EMT. He says, for instance, ‘the 
older dualism of soul and body has been replaced by that of 
the brain and the rest of the body’ [Dewey 1916/2004: 322]. 
This comment anticipates Noë’s criticism against 
internalism I quoted in the last section. To take another 
example, many theorists [e.g. Clark 2008; Gallagher 2013; 
Vaesen 2014] cite the following passage from Dewey’s 
Essays in Experimental Logic as an evidence that he 
endorses something like EMT. 
 
Thinking, or knowledge getting, is far from 
being the armchair thing it is often supposed 
to be. The reason it is not an armchair thing 
is that it is not an event going on exclusively 
within the cortex…. Hands and feet, 
apparatus and appliances of all kinds are as 
much a part of it [thinking] as changes in the 
brain. Since these physical operations 
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(including the cerebral events) and 
equipments are a part of thinking, thinking is 
mental, not because of a peculiar stuff which 
enters into it or of peculiar non-natural 
activities which constitute it, but because of 
what physical acts and appliances do: the 
distinctive purpose for which they are 
employed and the distinctive results which 
they accomplish. [Dewey 1916/1958: 9, 
original emphasis] 
 
In this passage Dewey claims that thinking involves body 
organs and environmental instruments. Moreover, he does so 
on the basis of two ideas that are similar to the ones that 
invite many contemporary theorists to endorse EMT. One of 
them is ‘functionalistic psychology’, which identifies 
thinking in terms of its purpose, i.e. problem solving, rather 
than some peculiar stuff or a non-natural essence. Dewey 
holds that anything counts as a participant in thinking as far 
as it contributes to solving problems. This resembles Clark 
& Chalmers’ ‘parity principle’, which says: ‘If, as we 
confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process 
which, were it to go on in the head, we would have no 
hesitation in accepting as part of the cognitive process, then 
that part of the world is [……] part of the cognitive process’ 
[Clark & Chalmers 1998: 8].viii The other idea is 
‘instrumentalism’, i.e. the position that rejects the 
epistemic/practical dichotomy, and views cognition as a tool 
for controlling the relationship between organism and 
environment. Dewey emphasizes that we often solve 
problems through active engagement with the environment. 
This anticipates contemporary cognitive scientists’ 
suggestion that there are ‘epistemic actions’ [Kirsh & 
Maglio 1994], i.e. actions that enable us to transform 
problems so that they can be solved in easy, quick, or reliable 
ways. The EMT theorists [e.g. Clark & Chalmers 1998; 
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Menary 2007] hold that the existence of these actions 
supports EMT: according to these theorists, epistemic action 
is a kind of extended cognitive process. 
 
However, on my reading, Dewey should not be regarded as 
a proponent of EMT. I find two crucial points on which 
Dewey would disagree with the EMT theorists: first, Dewey 
doesn’t think at all that mind has some boundary; second, he 
denies that mind primarily belongs to individual agents. In 
the following subsections, I will explicate these points in 
turn. 
 
2.2 THE UNBOUNDED MIND 
 
For Dewey, mind has some locus, but it has no boundary. 
Godfrey-Smith makes this point as follows: 
 
Clark & Chalmers think that the routine use 
of notebooks, smartphones and the like 
motivates a view in which some of these 
devices are seen as inside, not outside, the 
mind itself. They accept a view in which 
boundaries exist somewhere, and their 
response to the cognitive role of these tools is 
to extend the boundaries of mind outward. I 
think that Dewey sees a relocation of the 
boundary as the wrong response. It is central 
to Dewey’s outlook that the entanglement 
between mind and the rest of nature brought 
about by communicative technologies is local 
and constrained, but not in a way that 
involves a boundary, either standard or 
unorthodox, between the two. [Godfrey-
Smith 2014: 288] 
 
For this reason, Dewey’s view should be characterized as 
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‘the unbounded mind’, rather than the extended mind. His 
answer to the question ‘where does the mind stop, and the 
rest of the world begin?’ is simply ‘nowhere’. In contrast, 
the proponents of EMT (such as Clark) share with 
internalists the assumption that the boundary that divides the 
mind and the world exists, and then, contra internalists, 
claim that it can lie somewhere outer than skull and skin. 
They don’t take into account the possibility that the 
boundary of mind simply doesn’t existix. Now, from where 
does this divergence between Dewey and those who assume 
the existence of the boundary originate? Godfrey-Smith 
doesn’t try to answer this question. So I try it by myself.  
 
The answer to this question is concerned with what Dewey’s 
overall project aims at. Dewey is a well-known naturalist. 
However, he does not intend to solve the mind-body problem 
by locating mind into a certain region of the physical world, 
but instead to ‘do away with’ [Dewey 1929/1958: xiv] it. He 
is committed to a non-physicalistic (more specifically, 
neutral-monistic) kind of naturalism, according to which 
nature is not a thing that would be ultimately determined by 
physics. Rather, it is something that should be revealed in 
various ways of inquiry and as various phases of the 
‘growth-process’ [ibid.: 275]. This process exhibits three 
phases: (1) ‘the physical’, which is the trait of non-purposive 
activities; (2) ‘the psycho-physical’ or biological, which 
denotes the trait of purposive activities characterized by 
‘need-demand-satisfaction’ cycle; (3) ‘the mental’, which 
designates the trait of meaningful activities involved in 
linguistic communication. He tries to ‘naturalize’ (and thus 
demystify) the mind through ensuring the continuity 
between matter, life, and mind. The distinction between 
them is nothing but ‘the one of levels of increasing 
complexity and intimacy of interaction among natural 
events’ [ibid.: 261]. 
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It is important to note here that Dewey’s naturalistic world-
view is process-based rather than entity-based [cf. Johnson 
2010]. For this reason, Dewey conceives of neither mentality 
nor materiality as kinds of entities, but both as forms of 
activities. He makes this point when he says: 
 
That to which both mind and matter belong is 
the complex of events that constitute nature. 
This becomes a mysterious tertium quid 
[third entity], incapable of designation, only 
when mind and matter are taken to be static 
structures instead of functional characters. 
[ibid.: 75] 
 
Therefore, he urge us to replace the use of nouns such as 
‘mind’ and ‘matter’ by the use of adjectives and adverbs 
such as ‘mental’ or ‘mentally’ and ‘material’ or ‘physically’. 
In this metaphysical world-view, mind is not simply ‘in the 
head’. Nevertheless, it is not ‘extended’ in the sense of being 
located inside a certain spatial region of the physical world. 
Dewey opposes dividing the reality into regions of entities, 
each of which is spatially isolated from each other. Instead, 
he seeks to restore the ‘functional link’ between different 
phases or aspects of nature. 
  
To see the organism in nature, the nervous 
system in the organism, the brain in the 
nervous system, the cortex in the brain is the 
answer to the problems which haunt 
philosophy. And when thus seen they will be 
seen to be in, not as marbles are in a box but 
as events are in history, in a moving, growing 
never finished process. [ibid.: 295, original 
emphasis] 
 
Now we are in a position to understand what Dewey’s 
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project aims at. For him, inquiring ‘where the mind is’ is 
tantamount to asking how the mind takes place in the growth 
of nature that crosses divisions of biology and culture, of 
individuals and groups, and of the inner and the outer. What 
matters is not drawing a boundary between mind and world, 
but identifying the link between the mental and the non-
mental. In this way, Dewey’s view of the locus of mind is 
part of a naturalization project that is quite different from 
that of EMT theorists, and hence it cannot be easily 
introduced into the physicalistic framework that the EMT 
theorists (or most of contemporary theorists in general) 
adopt.  
 
However, by bringing Dewey’s position into view, we 
discover a deeper point concerning the locus of mind. The 
truly radical antithesis to Cartesianism turns out not to be the 
view that mind is extended into the world, but instead the 
one that rejects the division between mind and world itself. 
In this regard, EMT might not be radical enough to 
undermine the dominance of Cartesianism. 
 
2.3 SOCIAL MIND AND INDIVIDUALIZED MIND 
 
Next, I will articulate Dewey’s view of the locus of mind in 
detail. His concise statement about this topic is found in the 
following passage from his Experience and Nature: 
 
Domination by spatial considerations leads 
some thinkers to ask where mind is. 
…[A]ccepting for the moment the standpoint 
of the questioner (which ignores the locus of 
discourse, institutions and social arts), 
limiting the question to the organic 
individual, we may say that the “seat” or 
locus of mind―its static phase―is the 
qualities of organic action, as far as these 
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qualities have been conditioned by language 
and its consequences. [Dewey 1929/1958: 
291] 
 
In this way, Dewey holds that mentality is localized in 
biological activity (or ‘organic action’ in his words) from 
which it emerges. Two points should be noted here.  
 
First, Dewey claims that biological activity is a ‘transaction’ 
between organism and environment. He expresses this idea 
as follows: 
 
Life denotes a function, a comprehensive 
activity, in which organism and environment 
are included. Only upon reflective analysis 
does it break up into external conditions―air 
breathed, food taken, ground walked upon―
and internal structures―lungs respiring, 
stomach digesting, legs walking. [ibid.: 9] 
 
[……] living as an empirical affair is not 
something which goes on below the skin-
surface of an organism: it is always an 
inclusive affair involving connection, 
interaction of what is within the organic body 
and what lies outside in space and time 
[……]. [ibid.: 282] 
 
‘Whatever else organic life is or is not, it is a 
process of activity that involves an 
environment. It is a transaction extending 
beyond the spatial limits of the organism. An 
organism does not live in an environment; it 
lives by means of an environment. [……] 
The processes of living are enacted by the 
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environment as truly as by the organism; for 
they are an integration’ [Dewey 1938/1986: 
32, original emphasis]. 
 
As expressed in these passages, Dewey holds that biological 
activity involves the environment: life is basically 
transactivex. Given this, and given that mind is localized 
where life is, mind also turns out to be transactive: it is a way 
of interaction between organism and environment.  
 
Second, for Dewey, mind is continuous with life without 
being identical with it. His principle of continuity states that 
activities of thinking (or ‘inquiry’ in his word) ‘grow out of 
organic activities, without being identical with that from 
which they emerge’ [ibid.: 26]. The following two 
statements account for how mind differs from life: 
 
‘Mind denotes the whole system of meanings 
as they are embodied in the workings of 
organic life’ [Dewey 1929/1958: 303]. 
 
‘Meanings do not come into being without 
language, and language implies two selves 
involved in a conjoint or shared undertaking’ 
[ibid.: 299].xi 
 
The word ‘meaning’ is used to designate the way activities 
have significant effects on other (possible) activities. The 
upshot of Dewey’s points is that mental activities differ from 
mere biological activities in that they are conferred meanings 
through being involved in linguistic communication. 
Therefore, he says:  
 
‘As a matter of fact every individual has 
grown up, and always must grow up, in a 
social medium. His responses grow 
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intelligent, or gain meaning, simply because 
he lives and acts in a medium of accepted 
meanings and values. [……] Through social 
intercourse, through sharing in the activities 
embodying beliefs, he gradually acquires a 
mind of his own’ [Dewey 1916/2004: 283].  
 
More briefly, ‘[m]ind is [……] a function of social 
interactions’ [Dewey 1929/1958: xiii]. 
 
Now we come to a crucial point in which Dewey’s view 
diverges from EMT: in Dewey’s view, mentality does not 
belong primarily to individual agents. Rather, it is primarily 
attributed to communicative activities and performances in 
which multiple agents participate. Recall the bracketed note 
in the passage I quoted at the beginning of this section. There 
Dewey suggests that, as well as individual organisms’ 
action, products of interpersonal activities such as 
‘discourse, institutions and social arts’ are candidates for loci 
of mind. Each of these products is a system of meanings 
shared in some community, and hence they are qualified as 
mental. Thus, unlike the proponents of EMT, Dewey doesn’t 
hold that individual agents’ mental activities are constituted 
by the social environment. Rather, he claims that no mental 
activity is owned by some individual agent from the outset. 
It is absurd, he says, to think that any thought or experience 
is primarily owned by someone, as well as to think that a 
house is primarily owned by someone.  
 
Nevertheless, he admits that an individual agent is capable 
of having a mind: mind is sometimes appropriated by 
individuals in a derivative way [cf. Johnson 2010; Godfrey-
Smith 2014]. Then, how does the appropriation occur? 
Dewey answers to this question as follows: 
 
In first instance and intent, it is not exact nor 
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relevant to say “I experience” or “I think”. 
“It” experiences or is experienced, “It” thinks 
or is thought, is a juster phrase. [……] To say 
in a significant way, “I think, believe, desire,” 
instead of barely “it is thought, believed, 
desired,” is to accept and affirm a 
responsibility and to put forth a claim. It does 
not mean that the self is the source or author 
of the thought and affection nor its exclusive 
seat. It signifies that the self as a centred 
organization of energies identifies itself (in 
the sense of accepting their consequences) 
with a belief or sentiment of independent and 
external origination. [Dewey 1929/1958: 
232-233, original emphasis] 
 
There Dewey claims that the appropriation of mind is a 
matter of responsibility. An activity of experiencing or 
thinking is appropriated by an individual agent, when the 
agent is responsible for it, in other words, when the agent is 
capable of identifying the activity as his own and of 
accepting its consequences. This happens, once again, when 
language enter the picture: ‘Through speech a person 
dramatically identifies himself with potential acts and deeds’ 
[ibid.: 170]. We should notice here that each of us can 
communicate with himself or herself in the form of inner 
speech (or ‘soliloquy’ in Dewey’s word). Hence, besides 
interpersonal (or person-tool) activities of communication, 
intrapersonal ones qualify as mental, too. Thus, Dewey 
admits that the mental can be appropriated by individual 
agents as a result of ‘internalizing’ [Vygotsky 1934/1986] 
linguistic symbols that are originally used for 
communication. Mind is thus individualized owing to 
language, though it is primarily a social phenomenon. 
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3. TOWARDS SOCIALLY DISTRIBUTED COGNITION 
 
Is Dewey’s conception of mind still viable today? I think not. 
His view has a certain defect and requires some 
modification. I will suggest that the ‘socially distributed 
cognition theory’ offers a key idea for such modification.  
 
The defect in question is found in Dewey’s view of (non-
human) animal mind. He says, ‘[i]t is safe to say that psychic 
events, such as are anything more than reactions of a creature 
susceptible to pain and diffuse comfort, have language for 
one of their conditions’ [Dewey 1929/1958: 169]. It follows 
from this that non-linguistic animals (and pre-linguistic 
children) don’t have minds. Indeed, Dewey explicitly 
affirms this consequence. He concedes that they feel: their 
activities are coloured by certain felt qualities. However, 
these qualities are said to be not meaningful: their activities 
make no significant difference to other (possible) activities. 
For this reason, Dewey claims that they don’t have minds.  
 
At this point, he falls into anthropocentric chauvinism. As 
Godfrey-Smith [2014] points out, contemporary psychology 
shows that many non-linguistic animals modify their 
behaviours on the basis of their past experiences and so 
exhibit something more than reactions to stimuli. This fact is 
the evidence that their experiences are meaningful in 
Dewey’s sense. Therefore, it should be admitted that non-
linguistic animals have minds, too. Moreover, given the 
continuity between human beings and other animals, only a 
part of our mental items should require language. Thus, 
Dewey’s conception of mind turns out to be too restricted. 
Mind surely has a base layer that Dewey doesn’t recognize.  
 
In my view, what Dewey conceives of as ‘mind’ should be 
identified with what is called ‘cognition’ in the socially 
distributed cognition theory (SDCT) proposed by Hutchins 
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and developed by Giere among others. Hutchins limits the 
use of the term ‘cognition’ to designate symbol 
manipulation, and he claims that cognition in this sense is 
social and cultural in nature. According to his SDCT, any 
system which generates intelligent behaviours through 
symbol manipulation is regarded as a cognitive system, so 
that, in addition to individual agents, ‘socio-cultural 
systems’ such as human groups and human-tool systems 
qualify as cognitive in their own rights. The scope of such 
systems ranges from human-pen-paper systems and human-
computer systems to ship navigation teams [Hutchins 1990] 
and the Hubble telescope system [Giere 2006]. Therefore, 
‘cognition’ as defined in SDCT has a meaning that is quite 
different from ‘mind’ as used in ordinary situations. Latour 
[1996] indicates this point in his comment on Hutchins 
[1995], by saying, ‘[according to SDCT] cognition has 
nothing to do with minds nor with individuals, but with the 
propagation of representations through various media’ 
[ibid.: 55]. Likewise, Giere [2006] states that ‘we should 
resist the temptation to ascribe full agency, including having 
a mind, to distributed cognitive systems’ [ibid.: 112].  
 
SDCT denies that cognition is (always) in the head, and 
hence it has often been conflated with EMT. However, there 
is a substantial difference between them: while EMT 
attributes extended cognitive processes to individual agents, 
SDCT attributes them to socio-cultural (or ‘distributed’) 
systems.xii Hutchins makes this point when he offers an 
account for the case of calculation by writing. He says, 
‘[……] when the symbols are in the environment of the 
human, and the human is manipulating the symbols, the 
cognitive properties of the human are not the same as the 
properties of the system that is made up of the human in 
interaction with these symbols’ [Hutchins 1995: 361]. Thus, 
for example, in the case where I solve an arithmetic problem 
through calculation by writing, my cognitive properties are 
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different from the whole system composed of me, pen, and 
paper: The process of manipulating symbols in the 
environment is, though qualified as a cognitive process, not 
attributed to me, but to the me-pen-paper system as a whole.  
 
Because of this, SDCT succeeds in capturing a fact EMT 
fails to do: the fact that we usually accomplish cognitive 
tasks together with other agents or instruments. It captures 
this fact in terms of division of cognitive labor among the 
distributed cognitive system. According to SDCT, each 
distributed cognitive system accomplishes cognitive tasks 
through interaction among multiple actors, and each of us is 
nothing but one of these actors. Instruments, as well as other 
agents, can be regarded as co-actors that help our cognitive 
task performances. In this regard, the environment is said to 
be ‘one’s partner or cognitive ally’ [Hollan, Hutchins & 
Kirsh 2000: 192], rather than a part of one’s own mind. This 
conception of environmental contribution enables us to 
understand why we rely on environmental resources. When 
we confront complex cognitive tasks, we usually rely on 
tools and other agents. However, the moral we should derive 
from this fact is not that our cognitions are sometimes 
extended into the environment, but that our cognitions are 
usually complemented by other actors’ support. We manage 
to produce rich cognitive achievements, not because each of 
us has great cognitive capacities partly realized by 
environmental resources, but instead because the 
environment is full of co-actors to cooperate with. Although 
our cognitive capacities are quite limited, our problem-
solving behaviors in large part are not produced by each of 
us alone.  
 
SDCT fits very well with Dewey’s conception of cognition: 
Both of them recognize that higher cognitive activities are 
primarily social. Moreover, both of them do so while 
avoiding the individualistic dogma to which EMT is 
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committed. Thus, when it is reconstructed so that its scope 
is limited to a certain class (higher, symbolic class) of the 
cognitive, Dewey’s view looks to be promising. Indeed, 
there is room for and prospect of incorporating Dewey’s 
insight into SDCT. Although SDCT is proposed as a general 
framework for cognitive phenomena, its proponents rarely 
explicate the relationship between socially distributed 
(interpersonal or person-tool) cognition and individual 
(intrapersonal) onexiii. Thus, understanding how these two 
sorts of cognition are related with each other and how 
individual cognition emerges from socio-cultural 
interactions among multiple actors remains a future task. 
Dewey’s theory of appropriation I introduced in the last 
section, which invokes responsibility for activities and 
internalization of symbols in order to account for the 
appropriation of mind, might serve this purpose.  
 
Then, what difference will be made when we incorporate the 
idea of Dewey and SDCT theorists into cognitive science? 
Will it promote our understanding of cognition? Among 
internalists, there are some theorists [e.g. Rupert 2009] who 
oppose (not only EMT, but also) SDCT. Against them, 
however, I want to claim that SDCT offers a unified way of 
explaining intelligent behaviours: it enables us to explain the 
same kind of explananda (i.e. intelligent behaviours) by 
appealing to the same kind of explanans (i.e. cognitive states 
or processes)xiv. For example, given that an intrapersonal 
symbol-manipulating process and a socially distributed one 
(such as those involved in calculation by writing) result in 
the same sort of problem-solving behaviors, why should we 
treat them in different ways by regarding only the 
intrapersonal one as cognitive? From Dewey’s and the 
SDCT theorists’ view point, the internalist way of 
explanation is ad hoc, in the respect that it tries to explain 
the same sort of intelligent behaviors in different ways. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
So far I have tried to show that Dewey’s view on the locus 
of mind indicates a possible kind of anti-Cartesianism 
(though it requires a certain modification). I don’t deny that 
it looks somehow exotic from the contemporary perspective. 
Especially, I have no idea how promising his radical project 
of naturalization, which is based on non-physicalistic and 
process-based metaphysics, is. However, rather than 
pursuing this point further, I want to stress here that we can 
learn something from him. I will mention two morals we can 
get. First, we should realize that the boundary of mind 
question is not necessarily basic. Those who regard Dewey 
as a pioneer of EMT overlook the possibility that this 
question is dissolves by rejecting an underlying assumption: 
the existence of the boundary itself. The EMT theorists 
should account for (or, at least, be aware of) the reason why 
they still accept this assumption while arguing against 
internalism. Second, we should think, as Dewey and the 
SDCT theorists do, that higher cognitive activities do not 
primarily belong to individual agents. They are social 
phenomena in which multiple actors participate.  
 
In concluding, I propose that, if you are unwilling to accept 
the Cartesian picture of the mind, you should overcome the 
error to regard human cognitive activities as individualistic. 
My consideration reveals that EMT commits this error in 
common with Cartesianism. Dewey’s philosophy of mind 
encourages us to reconsider the place of individual mind in 
human cognitive activities and performances.  
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NOTES 
iAn exception among the proponents of EMT is Chalmers [1996], who 
is explicitly against physicalism. 
iiIn fact, the EMT theorists disagree on the scope of EMT: some [e.g. 
Clark & Chalmers 1998] claim that only non-conscious mental items are 
extended, while others [e.g. Noë 2004] insist that conscious ones are 
extended, too; some [e.g. Clark & Chalmers 1998] claim that both mental 
states and processes are extended, while others [e.g. Rowlands 2010] 
hold that mental processes alone are extended. 
iiiThere are many versions of the position called the ‘extended mind’: (1) 
The functionalist version, which individuates mental states and events in 
terms of their functional (or computational) roles, and permits these roles 
to be played in part by the environment [e.g. Wilson 1994, 2004; Clark 
& Chalmers 1998; Clark 1997, 2008; Wilson & Clark 2009; Wheeler 
2010]; (2) The so-called ‘second wave’ version of EMT, which identifies 
cognitive processes as manipulations of certain structures, and admits 
that these structures may be external as well as internal [e.g. Rowlands 
1995, 2010; Menary 2007; Sutton 2010]; (3) The enactivist version, 
which regards perceptual experiences as a kind of skill-based actions, 
and holds that the environment participates in those actions [e.g. Hurley 
1998, 2010; Noë 2004, 2009; Gallagher 2013]. Among enactivists, there 
are some [e.g. Thompson & Varela 2001; Thompson & Stapleton 2009; 
Di Paolo 2009; Hutto & Myin 2013] who don’t formulate their positions 
as versions of vehicle externalism. I don’t classify their positions into 
EMT. 
ivThough the EMT theorists rarely state explicitly who the subjects of 
putative extended mental states or processes are, we can find in their 
writings some clues which suggest that (at least some of) the subjects in 
question are individual agents (including humans). For example, Clark 
& Chalmers [1998] mention an Alzheimer patient (‘Otto’) as a subject 
of putative extended beliefs, and obviously the patient is an individual 
human agent. Likewise, Menary [2007] opposes the picture of cognition 
that assumes a ‘pre-existing cognitive agent’, and claims that cognitive 
agents (which, I guess, include individual agents) are made up by internal 
resources and external ones which are integrated in the completion of 
cognitive tasks [ibid.: 63]. We might add Noë, because he proposes a 
version of vehicle externalism that are concerned with conscious 
experiences, and each subject of conscious experience is supposed to be 
an individual agent. 
vAn obvious functional difference between the inner information flow 
and the extended one is that, unlike the former, the latter is always 
mediated by action and perception (at least in cases of normal, non-
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cyborg agents), and this seems to be relevant because mental states and 
processes are reasonably thought to be individuated partly in terms of 
their causal relations to perception and action. Indeed, we might argue 
that this difference between the inner information flow and the extended 
one is crucial, since it is natural to think that any information that requires 
action and perception to be accessed is not in mind. For example, if 
someone must make a certain action in order to retrieve some 
information, it should be because he or she doesn’t remember the 
information. 
viThe question which one is superior between the hypothesis of extended 
cognition and the hypothesis of embedded cognition is one of the hottest 
topics in the boundary of mind debate. For an important examination of 
it, see Rupert [2004] and Sprevak [2010]. For a relevant consideration, 
see the note 14 in this paper. 
viiHere I use the word ‘individualism’ to denote the tendency to explain 
our behaviours exclusively in terms of individual cognition. The version 
of internalism to which the EMT theorists are committed is extreme in 
that it tries to explain even those behaviours that are achieved through 
cooperation or tool-use in individualistic terms. 
viiiIn fact, there is a fundamental difference between Dewey’s 
functionalistic psychology and ‘functionalism’ that underlies the parity 
principle: the former is inspired by Darwinian evolutionary biology, 
whereas the latter is inspired by computationalist cognitive science. 
ixFor example, Clark’s commitment to the existence of the boundary of 
mind is found in the so-called ‘trust and glue’ conditions he proposes 
(reliable availability, easy accessibility, automatic endorsement, and 
conscious endorsement in the past [Clark 1997: 217; Clark & Chalmers 
1998: 17]). These conditions are meant to determine whether an external 
information resource constitutes someone’s mental states or not. Thus, it 
turns out that we can delineate the boundary of someone’s mind by 
applying these conditions. 
xDewey’s claim that not only mind but also life is not bounded by skin 
is remarkable, because most of the EMT theorists deny this. For 
example, when Clark says that mind is made up of biology and 
technology, he assumes that biological life is confined inside skin (in 
cases of normal, non-cyborg humans). As an exception among the 
proponents of EMT, Ingold [2011] explicitly endorses the view that life 
is unbounded. As I see it, Ingold’s metaphysical world-view bears a close 
resemblance to Dewey’s one. 
xiDewey uses the term ‘language’ to mean a broader range of things than 
spoken and written language. In his terminology, ‘it includes also not 
only gestures but rites, ceremonies, monuments and the products of 
industrial and fine art. A tool or machine [……] says something, to those 
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who understand it, about operations of use and their consequences’ 
[Dewey 1938/1986: 51-52, original emphasis]. 
xiiWhereas Giere is clear about the distinction between EMT and SDCT, 
Hutchins is not. However, Hutchins criticizes Clark for not paying 
enough attention to ‘cultural practices’, or ‘the things people do in 
interaction with one another’ [Hutchins 2011: 440, original emphasis]. 
xiiiThough Giere [2006] makes clear the distinction between individual 
cognition and socially distributed cognition, he offers no further account 
of the relationship between them. Hollan et al. [2000] suggest that ‘we 
can use the concepts, constructs, and explanatory models of social 
groups to describe what is happening in a mind’ [ibid.: 177], but they 
provide no detailed explication of this topic. 
xivThis consideration in terms of explanatory unification has been 
mentioned by the EMT theorists as an advantage of the hypothesis of 
extended cognition over that of embedded cognition. For example, 
Chalmers says, ‘[E]xtended states can function in explanation in very 
much the same way that beliefs function, and they should be regarded as 
sharing a deep and important explanatory kind with beliefs. This 
explanatory unification is the real underlying point of the extended mind 
thesis’ [Chalmers 2008: xiv]. However, though it’s true that this 
consideration gives us a convincing reason to admit that there are non-
internal cognitive processes, it offers no reason to think that individual 
agents’ cognitive processes are extended. Therefore, we cannot justify 
EMT on the basis of explanatory unification. 
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